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FROM time to time persons acquainted with the administration of bank-
ruptcy in the federal courts have demonstrated that the traditional pro-
cedure of handling such cases was open to severe criticism, and that in
many instances funds had been misappropriated, bribes accepted, and
other abuses practiced. In fact, it is not unusual to find the opinion that
bankruptcy matters are generally administered dishonestly.
Customarily, bankruptcy administration provides for the election of
a trustee at a meeting of creditors of the estate, and for the appoint-
ment of a receiver by the court at the time of adjudication of bank-
ruptcy in such cases where, in the court's judgment, the condition of
the bankrupt's assets requires that there be some supervision between
the time of adjudication of bankruptcy and the election of the trustee.1
In practice, receivers are appointed in most "asset cases," and the major
portion of the activity of liquidation usually takes place prior to the
election of the trustee,2 whose task generally centers about creditor's
rights except when the operations of the business are to be continued.
The trustee and the receiver deal with the court through the referee,
who relieves the judge of much of the detailed work necessary in the
tInstructor of Economics, Yale University. The author wishes to ackMowledge his
appreciation of a grant-in-aid from the Graduate School of Yale University without
which this study could not have been completed. The conclusions reached are those of the
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1. 30 STAT. 545 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 11(3) (1934); cf. 52 STAT. 842 (193S),
11 U.S. C. § lla(3) (Supp. 1938).
2. AV. J. DoNovAN, et al, ADmrxISTrATION OF BA-mKnUyT ESTATzS, R xo.
OF A INQUIRY . . . CoxDucrrn BEFoRE HoN. Tnom s D. TmHcuE, Jupo or Tim
UN=TED STATES DIsnucr COURT . . . House Judiciary Committee ed., 71st Cong., 3d
Sess. (1931) 8-9. Hereafter referred to as DoxovA.,N RFonT. 30 STT,. 552 (IS93), 11
U.S.C. §44(a); cf. 52 STAT. 852 (1938), 11 U.S. C. §44(a) (Supp. 1933).
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administration of a case.' The referee also makes the final statistical
report of each case after it is closed and the bankrupt has been discharged.
It has been the practice, in all the federal districts, for receivers to be
appointed from members of the bar at the discretion of the judges, who
sometimes have delegated their appointive power to a referee. Quite
frequently the attorney for the petitioning creditor was named receiver.4
Trustees are usually elected at a poorly-attended meeting of creditors.
Consequently, one who has been active in the solicitation of proxies can
readily dominate the election.' Such procedures have set the stage for
the selection of self-serving officials, who often misused their powers."
The purpose of this Article is to investigate certain results of an
experiment with a standing receiver, which was tried for some years in
the Southern District of New York. The scheme of turning over all
cases to a permanent official was, and still is,' proposed as a way out of
the unsatisfactory condition of bankruptcy administration. Actual use
of this device in New York makes possible the setting of a factual basis
for a discussion of the merits and demerits of this reform.
At the request of the federal district judges in New York City, the
Irving Trust Company agreed to accept appointments as receiver in all
bankruptcy cases for which the court deemed the appointment of a
3. UNITED STATES PRESIDENT, STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL
SYSTEM, TOGETHER WITH THE REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON BANKRUPTCY LAW
AND PRACTICE, SEN. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 29. Hereafter referred
to as THACHER-GARRISON REPORT. 30 STAT. 556 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 67 (1934); cf.
52 STAT. 858, 11 U. S. C. § 67 (Supp. 1938).
4. DONOVAN REPORT 41.
5. Id. at 13-14, 40-45. THACHER-GARRISON REPORT 30-38.
6. In addition to DONOVAN REPORT and THACHER-GARRISON REPORT, consult: REPORT
OF SPECIAL COMIITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY OF THE MERCHANTS' ASSOCIATION or NEW Yom:
(1924) summarized in 1 IRVING TRUST COMPANY, REPORT . . . AS RECEIVER AND TRUSTEn
IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS AND AS RECEIVER IN EQUITY CAUSES FOR THE CONSERVA-
TION OF ASSETS IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK (1932) 18, hereafter referred
to as IRVING REPORT, with designation of volume number; REPORT OF TIlE SPECIAL COM-
MITEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1925), summarized
in 1 IRVING REPORT 34-40; REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL LAW
AND BANKRUPTCY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1928), summarized in 1 IRVING
REPORT 40-42; Memorandum of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York to tile United States Supreme Court (Oct. 31, 1929) reprinted in 1 IRVING
REPORT 44-45; Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on Receiver and Bank.
rupicy Investigation in Chicago, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1934, committee print) ; I-I. R.
JUD. Comm. REP. ON RECEIVERSHIP AND BANKRUPTCY INVESTIGATION IN CHICAGO, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934, committee print) ; Hearings lefore Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Bankruptcy and Receivership Proceedings in Los Angeles, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
7. Attorney General Murphy has appointed a committee to investigate the admin-
istration of bankruptcy, and to prepare appropriate recommendations for needed improve-
ments. One specific item mentioned in the instructions to the committee is the feasibility
of permanent referees, receivers and trustees. United States Dep't of Justice Release,
Apr. 12, 1939.
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receiver necessary, and received the first appointments January 16, 1929.'
Subsequently, the trust company was designated in court rules as standing
receiver. It served in that position until July 15, 1934, when the court
acceded to newly-passed legislation which made impossible the assign-
ment of all receiverships to one person. During'the first part of this
five-year period, the company was named receiver in all bankruptcy
cases in the district, but after July 1, 1931, the area in which it was
standing receiver was limited to the counties of New York and Bronx,
and the cities of Yonkers, White Plains, Mount Vernon and New Ro-
chelle. Nevertheless, the company was occasionally appointed receiver
in other areas in the district, although not on an exclusive basis. It als-.
received occasional appointments in composition and equity cases. In most
of the bankruptcy cases in which the trust company was named rcceiver.
it was subsequently elected trustee by the creditors of the estate.10 After
July 15, 1934, however, the company accepted no new appointments as
receiver. Altogether, it acted in 4,367 cases of bankruptcy, as to which
reports of referees were filed with the court, as well as in an unknown
number of compositions, equity receiverships, proceedings under Section
77B, custodianships and ancillary proceedings.11 With but une exception,
no similar experiment with the device of a standing receiver in bank-
ruptcy had ever been tried anywhere else in the United States.1 2
The change in the rules of court in 1934 which ended the standing
receivership of the Irving Trust Company came as a result of legislation
8. The judges determined to use a trust company, and in order to avoid possible
charges of favoritism, selected one with which none of them had had close personal
connections. Also, the Irving Trust Company was at the time the most conveniently
located to the court. Hearings before House Judiciary Stubcomnittee on H. R. 145,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (unprinted, 1933; page references are to the typescript record) 59355-
537, 647. Hereafter referred to as CELLut HEARINGS.
9. This limitation was made at the request of the trust company which found it
impracticable to administer small-asset cases in the more remote areas of the district;
that is. the following counties: Columbia, Dutchess, Greene, Orange, Putnam, Rocdland.
Sullivan, Ulster and the remainder of Westchester. This limitation lends credence to
the contention that the device of standing receivers will not be useftl in larger areas,
or where the volume of cases is smaller. But in Michigan, the standing receiver operate-
successfully over a larger area. See note 12, infra.
10. With the consent of the court, Irving Trust Company as receiver distributed to
creditors proxy forms for the election of trustee, on which the availability of the trust
company as trustee was stated. The trust company was elected in the following per-
centages of cases in the following fiscal years: 1929, 71%; 1930, S01-; 1931, S9%;
1932, 91%; 1933, 86%. 2 IRVING REPoRT (1933) 18. Statistics for later years have not
been made available by the trust company.
11. Irving Trust Company states that figures for number and type of appointments
received after June 30, 1933 are not available. Up to that date Irving had been named
receiver, co-receiver, trustee or custodian in 5,122 cases under the bankruptcy laws, and
had also been appointed in 122 cases in equity. 2 Id. at 18.
12. In the Eastern District of Michigan, the Union Guardian Trust Co. of Detroit
occupied the position of standing receiver from Sept. 8, 1930, until Feb. 11, 1933.
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sponsored by opponents of "monopoly" and was included in the bill
which enacted Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. This legislation was
similar in effect to bills previously introduced specifically to change the
situation in New York City,13 which had been investigated in 1933 by
a congressional sub-c6mmittee. In its own words, the new law required
that courts "so apportion appointments of receivers and trustees . .
as to prevent any person, firm, or corporation from having a monopoly
of such appointments."' 4 The new provision was a disappointment to
the judges in the district, who were apparently well satisfied with the
work being done by the standing receiver3r
The trust company had requested that it be relieved of its duties for
some time before the law was altered,"6 consequently the court no longer
appointed it receiver after July 15, 1934. However, it remained in charge
of the cases previously assigned to it, and by the end of June, 1939, had
completed the work in all but 29 of the bankruptcy cases, exclusive of
77B proceedings, under its administration.
The existence of this small balance of open cases makes it impossible
to give a final report of the work done by the standing receiver.1  Never-
theless, the bulk of the work has been completed, and there is little reason
to think that the conclusions reached below would be altered by the
additional material. No one can predict with certainty when the last
of the open cases will be closed. Meanwhile, the question of establishing
standing receivers and trustees in all judicial districts has been reopened,
and hence a study bringing the New York statistics down-to-date should
be of interest.
13. H. R. Jun. Comx. REP. ox H. R. 8832, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 1 ct seq., here-
after referred to as CELLER REPORT.
14. 48 STAT. 923 (1934), 11 U.S.C. § 76(a) (1934). The Bankruptcy Act of 1938
did not reenact this provision, nor did it specifically repeal it. See 52 STAT. 940; 11
U. S. C. § 204 (Supp. 1938).
15. N.Y. L. J., July 13, 1934, p. 113, col. 6.
16. Ibid. The management of the trust company felt that the amount of publicity
being given to their receivership business would obscure their principal activity, which
was a general banking business. The indications, at present, are that, while the trust
company would favor the use of a standing receiver in New York, it would not accept
reappointment.
17. Until the preparation of figures for this study no data on cases closed after
June 30, 1933, in which Irving had acted as receiver or trustee, had been published.
The original referees' reports were on file at the district courthouse, but they had not
been examined in this connection. The records of Irving Trust Company did not
contain statistics comparable to the referees' reports. In preparing IrvixcN REroi0c%
(which cover the period to June 30, 1933) the trust company consulted the referees'
reports. CELLER HFalRNGs 730.
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II.
The following statistical comparison of the work of the standing
receiver in New York with the performance of other types of receivers
in the same district is not based upon all types of bankruptcy and equity
cases. The impracticability of obtaining comparable data limits the com-
parison to bankruptcy cases which proceeded either to liquidation or to
sale of a going concern for money. These formed the great majority of
the cases coming under the Bankruptcy Act during the period under
investigation. Data for them are to be found in the reports of referees,
which are filed with the court when a case is finally concluded. 4,367
cases of this type were given to the Irving Trust Company as standing
receiver, and 4,338 had been concluded by June 30, 1939. In the same
period, 23,856 cases of the same type were concluded in the district
following administration in some other way. Receivers had been ap-
pointed in some of these cases prior to or after the incumbency of the
standing receiver. In other cases, receivers were appointed in outlying
parts of the district during the incumbency of the standing receiver, and
in the rest, no administrator was appointed because of the absence of
assets or for some other reason."8 The size of these two groups of cases
makes it possible to assume with some confidence that a fair sample of
the activities of the two types of administration has been collected, and
that statistical comparisons are, therefore, justified.
The most useful statistical measure of the efficiency of administration
of a bankruptcy estate is the relationship of "Fees and Expenses of
Administration" to "Gross Assets Realized," because it provides a direct
measure of costs in terms of the funds actually collected. But it cannot
be used as the only measure of efficiency since certain types of activity
which would be beneficial to creditors might not be reflected in a lowering
of the ratio. For instance, if the administrator collected more funds,
the creditors would benefit even though the ratio of expenditures were
unchanged. Consequently, the ratio of amounts "Paid to Unsecured
Creditors" to the "Unsecured Claims Allowed" must also be considered.
This ratio is more subject to outside variables, such as varying amounts
of secured and priority claims, and, in the years prior to fiscal 1934,
the inclusion of claims of "no asset" cases in the amount reported as
unsecured claims allowed.
Certain of the items entering into these ratios require definition. The
item "Gross Assets Realized," contrary to first impression, is the amount
realized from the bankrupt estate after the deduction of the expenses
18. As used hereafter, the terms "administered by others" and similar phrases includc
those cases which had no administrator.
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of continuing the business, but before payments to creditors or for ex-
penses of administration. 9
The item "Fees and Expenses of Administration" is made up of many
types of expenditure, some of which can be controlled by the receiver or
trustee more closely than can others. Maximum fees are fixed by statute
or by rules of court.2 0 These cover commissions to receivers, trustees,
referees and auctioneers, and generally are based upon the value of the
assets handled. Other costs vary with each case. Some represent direct
expenditure by the administrator or his delegates. The remainder are
for services rendered by others. The receiver's or trustee's influence over
these charges is based upon the power to recommend to the court reduc-
tions in the amounts requested. Padding expenses was not an infrequent
occurrence before the appointment of the standing receiver; therefore
certain savings were possible. 2
In the typical case, the bulk of the fees and expenses of administration
are incurred during the first few months after the declaration of bank-
ruptcy. During this period assets are assembled and appraised, and many
of them are sold. During and following this period of activity there may
be some litigation in which legal expenses are incurred, but even in such
cases, it is unusual for more than one year to elapse before the admin-
istration has been put on a routine basis with no further expenses to be
charged, other than the statutory fee of the trustee based on the funds
passing through his hands. This situation is typical both of liquidation
cases and of cases in which business operations continue, since the
ordinary expenses of doing business are not included in the fees and
expenses of administration.
-Before proceeding to the statistical results of the investigation, it is
desirable to outline briefly the calculation of fees and expenses in an
individual case, and to discuss the major opportunities for increased
efficiency which were taken advantage of by the standing receiver.
The Irving Trust Company calculated fees and expenses as follows.
It included the fees and expenses of lawyers, accountants, auctioneers, and
others, after passing on the reasonability of their charges. It took occa-
sion to recommend the reduction of many such charges,22 and arranged
for a time a considerable reduction in the fees of collection agencies by
setting up an affiliated "Estates Collection Service" which was operated
at a loss. This service was abandoned when it was held that the Estates
19. Titles taken from Foam BANKRuPTcY No. 9, Report of Referee in& Bankruptcy
to Clerk. This has recently been replaced by FORm No. JS--19 in which "Gross Assets
Realized" has been changed to "Net Proceeds Realized". The former title had occasioned
some errors in reporting.
20. 52 STAT. 861 (1938), 11 U.S. C. § 76 (Supp. 1938).
21. DONOVAN REPORT 40-46; THACHER-GARRISON REPORT 29.
22. CELLER HEARINGS 495-497, 756-757, cf. 716-717.
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Collection Service was a subsidiary company which could not charge
fees apart from the receiver's own.23 Thereafter, collection work was
sometimes done by the trust company, and sometimes by collection agen-
cies which usually charged larger fees than those of the Estates Collection
Service.
In computing its own expenses, the company charged the actual salaries
of its employees for the times actually spent on the case up to the maxi-
mum per diem rate provided for under the rules oficourt. -" It also charged
other expenses directly applicable to a case.'-  In addition, the ourt
allowed commissions for the services of the trust company within the
statutory limits.
Income from commissions was expected to cover overhead costs,
salaries in excess of the maxima stated in the rules of court, expenses
of no asset cases, etc., and to leave a balance for profit. Over the perioid,
January 16, 1929-june 30, 1933, the receivership division of the trust
company calculated a profit of $167,572.50, after allowance for the cur-
porate income tax. Losses in the first two fiscal years were more than
balanced by gains in the last three.26 This profit, of course, was gained
from all the activities of the receivership division, including equity
receiverships. Results for later years have not been made available by
the trust company.
In addition to this source of revenue, the trust company received what-
ever profits its banking division made on the funds of bankruptcy and
equity estates which were deposited with it. The trust company did not
commence the transfer of such funds to itself until some months after
it had become standing receiver. Effective January, 1930, the Supreme
Court altered its bankruptcy rules to permit such a practice,- and the
trust company subsequently complied with the rule. However, it never
disturbed existing banking relationships when the operations of the busi-
ness were to be continued.as
23. Id. at 497-498, 752-754. In re Cameo Curtain, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 672 (1933).
24. Per diem rates up to $12 per day were allowed. 1 Irnvi:G R roc-a F1.
25. The Irving Trust Company's rule regarding such charges read as follows:
. . . the actual time spent by the group heads and the other Receiver's representatives.
or their office assistants, in rendering administrative services to the particular estate.
There are excluded from the time for which such charge is made, numerous time-c.n-
suming services, such as conferring with counsel, attending at creditors' meetings, attend-
ing at the Referees' offices, etc.
"The time actually spent by fieldmen in rendering services for the several estate-.
"The time spent by members of the 'Inventory, Appraisal and Sales Service,' desig-
nated as 'Inspectors of Sales,' in attending upon and supervising auction sales.
"The collections made by the 'Estates Collection Service." 1 IRVrNG Porr 59.
26. 2 id. at 36. A detailed break-down of expenses is given.
27. United States Supreme Court General Order in Bankruptcy, XLVI, 2R0 U. S.
617 (1930).
28. 1 IRvMG REmoar 93.
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The change in the bankruptcy rules was a result of representations
by the trust company that it could not continue the receivership division
without additional income.-" At the time, the division was operating at
a loss. The estimated profits obtained from these deposits without deduc-
tions for income taxes or general administrative overhead have been
stated by the trust company to be $469,530 for the period from March
1, 1930 to June 30, 1933.-0 During this same period the average deposits
of bankruptcy and equity estates were about $12,128,200; approximately
2Y27% of the average total deposits of the trust company.31
In studying the performance of the standing receiver, it must be
recognized that the prompt realization of asset values is an outlet for
efficiency in administration of estates that is fully as important as the
-- reduction of expenses. The money values of assets deteriorate so rapidly
after adjudication of bankruptcy that any slipshod procedure results
in losses to an estate. 32 Through its permanent organization, the trust
company was able to take prompt and effective action to collect accounts,
to discover assets, and to get proper prices through auctions which had
received adequate publicity.3" Such matters were attended to with great
care by the trust company in contrast to many cases of wilful misconduct
on the parts of certain receivers and trustees.34
Viewing the improvements just indicated, it is surprising to find that
the bankruptcy statistics reveal no great advantage in favor of the
standing receiver when the entire eleven-year period is considered.
As shown in Table I below, the percent of the net amount realized
used for fees and expenses of administration during the entire eleven-year
period was 30.2 for 4,242 cases administered by the Irving Trust
Company, and 28.3 for 23,856 cases administered by others. Year-by-
year comparison, however, shows interesting differences. The superiority
of the trust company was marked in cases closed in the period to June
30, 1933, but in later years other receivers were the leaders. This change
took place both as a result of increasing rates of expenses in cases admin-
istered by the trust company and of decreasing cost ratios in cases ad-
ministered by others. Examination of the percentages paid on unsecured
claims shows similar changes. With this measure as a basis for com-
parison, the standing receiver shows a definite statistical superiority over
the other receivers in four out of the first five years. After that, however,
the comparison is less favorable.
29. CELLER HEARINGS 544-548, 648-649, cf. 562.
30. Id. Communications from Irving Trust Co., dated November 24, 1933.
31. 2 IRVING REPORT 33.
32. DoNovAN REPORT 9-10, 66-69.
33. 1 IRVI REPoRT 61-72.
34. TEACHER-GAmusON REPORT 178-179; 1 IRVING REPORT 87-91.
[Vol. 49: 1
1939] STANDING RECEIVER IN BANKRUPTCY 9
TABLE L
RESULTS OF BA!xKRupTcy PROCEEDINGS IN THE SOUTHER; DismcT OF NEW YoraU, AS TO WIcH
REPORTS OF REFEREES WERE FILED %vITH THE COURT, JULY 1, 1928-Ju.,'z 30, 1939.
1 2 3 4 5 6 4-3 5-6
Net Percent of
Fiscal Number Fees and Proceeds Perce.t of Net Frcc13s
Year of Unsecured Paid to Exponses of ("Gross Uns1rVrCZ Used -c1
Ending Cases Claims Unsecured .4drnn:- Asscts" l Clzi= Fels .1
June 30 Reported Allowed Creditors istration Rciired Paid ExPense
Cases in which Irving Trust Company served as Rcch'er or Trustee
(all cases)
1929 2 $ 17,113 $ 5,320 $ 950 $ 6,800 31.1 14.0
1930 71 1,201,477 358,196 107,423 474,405 29.8 22.6
1931 446 9,827,915 992,842 430,636 1,536,390 10.1 23.0
1932 784 19,081,931 1,302,243 939,796 2,753,144 6.8 34.1
1933 1301 66,537,433 7,103,638 2,027,647 12,13,149 10.7 16.6
1934 469 55,238,307 447,919 372,649 1,149,742 .8 32.4
1935 727 47,675,304 2,327,542 1,469,017 4,611,136 4.9 31.9
(asset cases)
1936 267 59,786,717 9,523,815 3,885,995 14,712,342 16.0 26.4
1937 85 14,942,114 2,394,002 1,595,627 4,727,652 16.0 33.8
1938 56 24,669,933 2,470,379 4,233,619 7,215,717 10.0 53.7
1939 34 18,118,705 2,263,348 950,659 3,559,005 12.5 26.7
TOTAL 4242 $317,096,949 $29,189,244 $16,014,018 $52,959,482 9.2 30.2
Cases in which Irsing Trust Company did not serve as Receiher or Trustce
(all cases)
1929 2,239 $60,464,573 $ 6,275,611 $ 3,962,672 $11,953,348 10.4 33.2
1930 1,714 39,277,176 3,055M288 2,934,218 7,226,110 7.8 40.6
1931 1,869 40,882,312 2,907,542 4,177,746 7,744,506 7.1 53.9
1932 1,266 25,213,022 2,307,189 917,226 4,102,720 9.2 22.4
1933 1,897 59,051,955 8,544,228 4,144,762 15,782,22 14.5 26.3
1934 2,930 59,416,187 7,610,612 2,493,606 11,377,574 12.8 22.0
1935 1,875 73,636,620 1,464,447 659,216 2,752,110 19.9 24.0
(asset cases)
1936 2,186 20,012,477 3,214,346 1,733,S53 6,734,985 16.5 26.5
1937 2,667 49,270,904 10,436,420 2,067,866 13,202,794 2L2 15.7
1938 2,734 not 1,569,736 1,190,798 3,024,460 .... 39.4
1939 2,479 computed 1,371,950 1,658,037 7,812,7,6 .... 21.2
TOTAL 23,856 ......... $48,757,369 $25,995,000 $91,713,621 .... 23.3
Sources:
1. All figures in years, 1929-1933, IRvIu Rsrar, II, 24, Schedule B-1.
2. Years, 1934-1939.
(a) Irving Trust Company furnished Docket Numbers of cases administered, for which casso flaurms were
taken from original Reports of Referee filed in U. S. Dist. Ct.
(b) Totals for the district were taken from RitP. ATT'y Gnu. (1934-1939) with unpublished fgurc fur.
nished by Department of Justice.
(c) Figures for cases administered by others than Irving were found by subtraction.
Notes:
1. In 1932 and 1933 the District totals reported by Irving differ slightly from thcse re-rpte1 by Att.wr y
General, but the difference would change percentage figures only about let-. In It93 the Att om Gar-al'o
totals were overstated about $40,0OO,OO due to mistaken reporting in one large cane (McClelLna Strev.
Docket 56218). Figures used herein are corrected by this amounL
2. Referee's reports for 96 cases on the list furnished by Irving were not found. 73 of thez caresT were cmn-
eluded in fiscal year 1934, 16 in 1933, 2 in 1936. 3 in 1937, 1 in 1939 andl 1 in 1039. The author bs ievca
that none of these cases was large enough to influence totals significantly.
3. Data collected for this study has been transferred to Hollerith cards which will 1z made availhlae nr:n
request.
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A little more statistical information will be a useful preliminary to
a discussion of the probable reasons for this development. Since the
trust company took no new cases after July, 1934, the figures reported
in later years represent those in which proceedings were drawn out by
continued operation of the business, by litigation, or by other causes.
Consequently, an increase in costs in the cases reported by the trust com-
pany after fiscal 1934 might naturally be expected. However plausible
this hypothesis may seem, it does not fit the facts. As mentioned above,
the bulk of the expenses of administration, as distinguished from fees,
were incurred shortly after the receiver had been appointed, so there was
little reason for higher costs. in cases which were drawn out. The statistics
confirm this idea. In Table II are presented the results of a classification
by time of administration of 1,638 cases reported by the trust company
after July 1, 1933. There is no evidence of a definite tendency for
expenses to rise as time of administration increases, except in the last
two groups. These contain, however, but one case each, consequently
little reliance can be placed on the sharp increase shown. The weight of
the evidence seems to show that the increasing age of the cases reported
by the standing receiver cannot be the cause of the increasing costliness
of its administration.
TABLE II.
SEGREGATION BY TIME oF AD INISTRATION AND AMOUNT oF NET PRoCEEDS OF FEES AND
EXPENSES OF ADMINISTRATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF NET PROCEEDS.
1,638 Bankruptcy Cases administered by Irving Trust Company in Fiscal Years, 1934-1939
Number Number Percent of Net Proceeds used for Fees and Expcnses
of Years of Cases Size Grou ing of Net Procceds
Administered Reported No Assets $1-50,000 $50,001,- Tojal
0-1 320 0.0 50.9 .... 50.9
1-2 684 0.0 46.0 14.9 30.4
2-3 291 0.0 41.3 13.1 21.2
3-4 147 0.0 43.4 28.8 29.8
4-5 94 0.0 45.5 33.4 37.9
5-6 56 0.0 51.2 53.4 53.4
6-7 30 0.0 42.7 22.8 24.4
7-8 9 .... 53.1 16.5 19.9
8-9 3 .... 57.1 .... 57.1
9-10 2 .... 33.6 16.2 17.5
10-11 1 .... 80.0 .... 80.0
11-12 1 .... 74.8 .... 74.8
In view of the facts just related, it is clear that the gradual dispersal
of the receivership division of the trust company cannot have caused
inefficiencies which led to increased ratios of expense. Within a few
months after July 15, 1934, the major portion of the problems of all
estates of the type under consideration had been handled, and only routine
administration remained. Apparently there were no delays due to the
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departure of some of the high-salaried, experienced men, who had been
serving as "'receiver's representatives," and the break-up of the highly
organized staff;" hence no great effect on financial ratios could have
resulted.
It can be argued with some weight that the cases reported during the
early years of trust company administration did not present a fair sample
for comparison with the work of others, since the standing receiver
started with a clean slate, while the cases reported by others in any year
represented a cross-section of all types and ages. Such an argument
would proceed to the conclusion that the standing receiver's work must
be evaluated over its whole experience; not by the results of the first
few years when "problem cases" had not had their effect. But this con-
tention runs into difficulty with the fact that increasing length of admin-
istration is not associated with higher costs. Even so, some value remains
in the argument. The cases concluded under trust company administra-
tion after 1933 seem to have characteristics different from those settled
so expeditiously in the earlier period. Perhaps the fact that assets were
badly "frozen" in the later cases is associated with low recoveries on book
values from the start of the bankruptcy, and with high ratios of expense
of administration.
However, no matter what weight is given to the argument above, it
cannot be considered a complete solution of the question, for it does
not explain the changes in the results reported by other receivers and
trustees. In part, this change was due to increasing control over onm-
missions paid to referees. Prior to 1938. the fees of referees were fixed by
statute. However, the district court in New York obtained in 1933 sub-
stantial reductions in the commissions of referees whose annual incomes
were very large, chiefly by limiting amounts paid as indemnities or paid
to referees as special masters."6 In part also, this change may have been
brought about by the effect of the activities of the standing receiver upon
the bankruptcy bar. As will be shown below, conditions in the New York
district prior to 1929 were very bad. The percent of net proceeds paid
for fees of administration was 41.6 in 1924, 26.8 in 1025. 31.9 in 1927,
and 43.0 in 1928. The five-year break introduced by the use of the
standing receiver forced the former group to find new ways of earning
a living, and released judges and referees from old ways of doing things.
By 1934 there was available a group of lawyers who had had experience
under the standing receiver. A "new deal" was possible. Unquestionably,
35. Irving Trust Company has been vell kmown for its careful style of job organ-
ization. The organization of the receivership department is an example. 1 Invno R xrZxczT
47-84.
36. 32 STAT. 799 (1903), 11 U.S.C. §68 (1934), as amended, 52 STAT. 859, 11
U. S. C. § 68 (Supp. 1938) ; Bankruptcy Rule 21 (1933) of United States District Court,
Southern District of New York.
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the character of the bankruptcy bar in New York City was improved by
the change. 7
The most important clue seems to be found in the stages of the business
cycle. The period in which the standing receiver was actively receiving
appointments was on the whole one of severe economic depression. Bank-
ruptcies were frequent, prices of all types of goods were very low, and
buyers were hard to find. It will be remembered that the statistics used
in this study relate chiefly to liquidations, and that in such cases the bulk
of the selling was accomplished shortly after the declaration of bank-
ruptcy. In view of the adverse conditions, the trust company's work
can be held to be superior because it held its own in comparison with
the work of others, most of whom carried on the bulk of their work
under more favorable conditions. This contention would be particularly
true of the statistics for fiscal 1935 and later years.
To summarize: the statistical comparison over the entire eleven-year
period does not establish any clear superiority for the standing receiver,
such as was claimed for it on the basis of the results of the first five
years. It appears that part of the apparent superiority was due to the
fact that the standing receiver started with a clean slate. Nevertheless,
the burden of proof still rests with those who attack the standing receiver,
since its figures are about as satisfactory as those of other receivers who
operated at more favorable stages of the business cycle. Finally, the
interjection of the standing receiver gave an opportunity for a clean-tip
of the bankruptcy bar in New York City.88
37. DONOVAN REPORT 40-50, 103. Hearings before Senate Judiciary Colnmittec on
S3866, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 392.
38. An interesting sidelight on business organization appeared during the making of
this study. At the time of making the calculations referred to above, the author segregated
the cases of corporate debtors from those of non-corporate debtors. The results, which
are presented below, show that creditors of corporations fared better than creditors of
other types of business enterprise. This is a direct contradiction of the traditional con-
sequences of limited liability.
SEGREGATION BY TYPE OF BUSINESS UNIT OF REsuLTS OF 1,638 BANKRUPTCIES ADMIN-
ISTERED BY IRVING TRUST COMPANY IN FISCAL YEARS, 1934-1939
Size Grouping Number of Cases Percent of Proved
of Net Proceeds Reported Unsecured Claims Paid
Corporate Debtors
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III.
The decision of the district judges in New York City which led to
the appointment of a standing receiver in January, 1929, came after
many years of general dissatisfaction with existing practices of selecting
receivers and trustees. It came just after the discovery of certain specific
embezzlements of major importance which had led to several convictions
and to disciplinary action both among members of the bar and among
employees of the court itself, as well as to the resignation of one district
judge against whom impeachment proceedings had been threatened."
The necessity for improvement had been recognized for some time,""
and several other reform procedures had previously been tried without
success. The selection of promising young lawyers known to the judgets
fell down, because in many cases the lawyers were busy at other work
just at the time when prompt action was necessary to preserve assets.
Advancing the date of the first meeting of creditors in order to avoid
the appointment of a receiver resulted in even greater non-attendance.
The selection of receivers from a panel recommended by trade associa-
tions failed because the members of the panel refused cases unless large
fees were in prospect. The selection by the judges of a panel of individuals
to act as receivers in all cases was considered by the judges to be im-
practicable because of the probable use of pressures by politicians and
others to influence the choice of personnel.4 1
The use of the Irving Trust Company as standing receiver contained
the essence of the principal reform proposals put forward by proponents
of change both before and after the use of a standing receiver in the
New York district.' That is, there was created a permanent organi-
zation of responsible men whose full time was devoted to the manage-
ment of bankruptcy estates. This organization received all cases, large
and small, with the expectation that the excess statutory fees of larger
cases would cover the losses in the smaller ones. The facts that the work
in New York was done by a department of a private corporation and
39. DONoVAN REPoRT 48-50; CELLER HEARINGS 539-540, 552, 5V-5SR3.
40. Id. at 528-541. There was nation-wide dissatisfaction among judges. THnCac,-
G~AsoN REP oRT 4-5.
41. CwE= HEARINGS 530-535; DoNovN REpon 70-71.
42. Salaried receiver appointed by judges of the district, trustee to be elected only
in larger cases, REPORT OF THE SPECrAL Co m z oN BAIrUPTCY OF THE ,rcrrA='
AssocATioN OF NEW YoRK (1924) 7-8; official receiver for smaller eases, Rcro=w or Tun
SPEC.AL CommiTTEE ON BATERmurrc AmnT EsmATo, OF Tim Assocxuio. OF Tr BAn
OF THE Crnr OF NEW YORK (1925) 18-19; creation of a national officer to qualify suitable
trustees, judges to appoint from among them, DoxovA. rEPonTR 26-27; THAcuc--GAr-
BISON REPORT 107-114; "SABATH BilL,' 75th Cong., 1st Sess., H. I. 9 (1937), reprinted
in Hearings before House J'diciary Committee on H. R. 9 and H. R. (963, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess., Ser. 10 (1937) 1-11, 130; cf. Hearings before House Judiciary Comnrittee on
H. R. 6439 and H. R. 8o46, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 107-10.
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that there was a monopoly of receiverships in the district are of secondary
importance to the present study. They involve important issues which
are briefly discussed below but they do not affect the fact that a per-
manent official was created.
Opposition to and support for the plan finally chosen soon appeared
in resolutions of associations of merchants and the bar, in statements by
individuals, in testimony before various public hearings, and in legis-
lation designed to end the activities of the Irving Trust Company as
standing receiver. The debate culminated in hearings before a subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, headed by Representative
Celler, which heard evidence in New York in October, 1933, and later
reported favorably the 1934 legislation. 3
In general, the plan was supported by credit men, judges and bankers,
and criticized by bar associations and legislators.44 It would not be
difficult to show that those who were the principal gainers from the prior
system became the principal critics of the standing receiver .4' Their
arguments can be classified and criticized as follows.
1. Objections to the device of a standing receiver and trustee. The
argument was made that the problems of different bankruptcies were
so diverse that specialists were required to administer the various types.
A permanent officer could not therefore be sufficiently informed in all
43. In addition to this legislation, bills were introduced in several sessions of the
New York State Legislature designed to end the practice by forbidding state-chartered
corporations to act as receivers in bankruptcy. Governor Lehman vetoed such bills in
1933, 1934, 1935 and 1936 on the grounds that the bills would interfere with the discretion
of a federal agency. See N. Y. Senate Bill Printed No. 86, Jan. 2, 1936, 1 N. Y. SEN.
JouR. 19 (1936) and Veto Message dated March 14, 1936, 2 N. Y. SEN. J. (Exne. 170-
171, 1936). See p. 3, supra.
44. At the Celler Hearings, the opponents of the standing receiver were individual
attorneys and representatives of the Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey
and Connecticut, New York County Lawyers Association, New York State Bar Associa-
tion, Brooklyn Bar Association, Nassau County Bar Association, Queens County Bar
Association, Richmond County Bar Association and the Bronx County Bar Association.
The proponents of the reform, aside from the Irving Trust Company and associated
attorneys, were the senior judge of the district, and representatives of the Merchants'
Association of New York, New York Board of Trade, New York Credit Men's Agso-
ciation, Association of Cotton Textile Merchants of New York, Uptown Credit Group of
Textile Industry Division of Silk Association of America, Credit Clearing House, Down-
town Textile Credit Group and the Chamber of Commerce of the City of New York.
45. E.g., the statement of an attorney in CELLER HAxmNGs 718: ". . . there are
approximately eighteen to nineteen thousand lawyers in . . . New York, employing
probably twenty thousand in help . . . and we find that . . . these lawyers are prac-
tically outlawed in the way of acting as receivers." Cf. the Joint Resolution of the New
York State Legislature asking the Congress of the United States to end the monopoly,
which says inter alla, "A large volume of professional legal employment which legiti-
mately belong to the legal profession . . . is diverted to banking corporations." N. Y,
Sen. Res., Feb. 3, 1933, 1 N. Y. Ass. J. 511 (1933).
[Vol. 49, 1
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fields. Further, it was claimed that the problems met in the liquidation
of assets were chiefly business ones, not legal or banking in nature. Con-
sequently, creditors should continue to select trustees in each case, and
judges should appoint receivers specially versed in appropriate fields.
This line of argument ignores the nation-wide experience that the
traditional method of selecting receivers and trustees has been most un-
satisfactory.4" The results of such a method cannot be cured by a state-
ment that the judges have been to blame. Even were the judges to neglect
more pressing duties in order to examine carefully the needs of each
bankrupt estate and the qualifications of proposed receivers, it woould
be impossible to obtain men of high ability for the majority of cases,
because of the insufficiency of fees.4  The best that can be hoped for
under such a plan is satisfactory administration of large-asset cases.
Further, the general apathy of creditors which results in the selection
of poor trustees cannot be cured, for although some increase in interest
might be stimulated by proper education through credit associations, the
amounts involved in a majority of cases would not justify the time and
effort necessary for attendance at the election of trustees, nor provide
sufficient revenue to interest a high-quality man in the position.
Finally, the contention that a standing receiver is not sufficiently
versatile is not realistic, for the problems arising in liquidations are not
so varied as those in going concerns, and the bankruptcy business of most
districts is so large that the receiver can easily have in his office staff
specialists who have the necessary knowledge. This was the case with
the Irving Trust Company,4 8 and could be the case under any similar
proposal, such as the creation of a panel of qualified trustees.42
2. Objections to a monopoly of reccicrships in a district. At the
Celler hearings, several witnesses argued that the existence of a monopoly
in bankruptcy administration would confer upon a standing receiver
powers of patronage which might lead to domination of the bar. From
this premise, the alternative conclusions were either that there should not
be such monopolies or that the official receiver should he a court official.
While this argument was the most influential on the Celler Committee.O
it does not stand close inspection, for the fear of domination of the bar
through monopoly in bankruptcy grossly exaggerates both the supile
46. See notes 4, 5 and 6, supra.
47. DoxoVAi REPORT 75-78; THACHER-GAmisoN REror 110-114; CErL.E HnMuGs
557-558, 569.
48. 1 IRVING REPORT 47-57.
49. THAcHER-GAmISON REPORT 105-109.
50. There was considerable concentration of legal business in cases administered by
Irving, especially in the early years of its incumbency. This practice was widely criticized.
1 IRVING REPORT 97-102; 2 IRVING REPORT 25-23; CELw r HF-t rcs 2, 100, 639-44,
715-719, 720-721; CEPLm REPORT 3.
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qualities of lawyers and the importance of bankruptcy revenues to the
bar as a whole.
A more substantial point related to the monopoly associated with one
standing receiver in a district is the inevitability that adverse interests
will sometimes be encountered. Thus, the Irving Trust Company as a
bank might be a creditor of a bankrupt estate to which the Irving Trust
Company had been appointed receiver. More important, there might be
two or more bankrupt estates having conflicting claims one against
another; yet the standing receiver might easily be receiver or trustee
of all. Also, in a few cases the trust company might at the same time
be supervising continuing businesses which were in direct competition
with each other.
No one will deny the wisdom of the general principle that adverse
interests should be avoided. Even Judge Knox, the principal judicial
proponent of the standing receiver in New York, has stated that such
conflicts of interest must be carefully watched."' But two points should
be noted. First, however strong the feeling against adverse interests,
it cannot be made the basis of an attack against the idea of a standing
receiver and trustee. The difficulty can be avoided by having more than
one such official in each district. 2 Second, there is no evidence that the
Irving Trust Company acted improperly in any case. If the trust com-
pany foresaw this issue, it might decline to be nominated as trustee.5
In any case where adverse interests were discovered, it acted only after
the creditors and the court had been fully informed of the circumstances. 4
3. Objections to the use of a trust company in the position of standing
receiver. Some persons contended that no corporation could do the work
of administration so well as an individual who could give the matter
personal attention. This contention involves the familiar question of the
"corporate practice of law" which carries no conviction to the author's
mind. The idea that a corporation is an insensate being which makes
only mechanistic decisions is certainly as false as any claim that lawyers
as receivers are uniformly efficient, honest, and sympathetic.
Another unsubstantial objection was voiced by certain Congressmen
who pointed out that the Irving Trust Company, as receiver or trustee,
was making unfair profits by depositing funds with itself as bank. This, it
was claimed, enabled the receiver to make 6% on funds for which it
paid only Y2 %.55 Of course, since the receiver is not supposed to lend
the cash funds of the estate, he cannot be expected to do more than put
51. CELLM HrANGs 587-588,
52. See note 42, supra.
53. CLLER HEARINGS 493.
54. Id. at 396, 493.
55. Joint Hearings before Senate and House Judiciary Committees on& S. 3866, 72d
Cong., 1st. Sess., (1932) 346; CG.am REPORT 3.
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them into the care of some bank. There could not be any damage to
creditors in the procedure outlined so long as the Irving Trust Company,
as a bank, remained solvent." The policy did, however, contribute sub-
stantially to the earnings which should be attributed to the receivership
division of the trust company.
The result of these considerations can be summarized as follows. First,
evidence of nation-wide misuse of the positions of individual receivers
and trustees, and their attorneys, gives strong ground for a conclusion
that existing practices must be reformed. Second, of all the reform
proposals, that of a standing receiver and trustee has the most theoretical
merit. Finally, the record of actual administration by the standing receiver
in New York supports the general arguments in favor of this method of
reform.
56. Shortly after beginning to deposit these funds with itself, the trust company was
required to post United States bonds of equivalent value to secure the deposits. 1 Invn.;G
REPORT 94.
